SINO-INDIAN RELATIONS: OPENING OF NATHULA PASS
By Gokul Das
Much anticipated deadline for the Himalayan barrier between India and China was to melt. Even if they did not keep the date, India and China are on their way to creating history next spring. The reopening of a historic trade route after four decades clears the road to their past. And the future.
For centuries, Nathu La (La means "mountain pass") was on the Silk Route. Indian traders crossed the hump at some 14,500 feet above sea level, into Tibet and sold their wares. The Tibetans, too, paid return visits. There was a thriving trade. And not just trade. Nathu La was the north-south gateway for the between Tibet and India.
However things changed when the Dalai Lama, spiritual head of Tibets Buddhists, used the route to flee Tibet after Chinese invasion and take political asylum in India in 1959.
A military conflict three years later and again in 1967 between India and China made Nathu La a hot spot. A barbed wire fence divided the dragon and the elephant after the 1967 incident.
As relations gradually improved, this writer visited it in 1985, to be told that a week earlier, some Delhi schoolchildren had been there on a picnic. A good 15 years later in February 2000, accompanying Indian army chief, General V. P. Malik was an exciting moment. Chinese soldiers were surprised at seeing an Indian general come with gifts and greetings.
Beijing and New Delhi have since been working quietly at Nathu La, not raising either great hopes or hackles. But there is excitement where it matters in Sikkim. Says Chief Minister Pawan Kumar Chamling: "Investors from industry and organisations such as the World Bank will no doubt be attracted to Sikkim."
Like the buses plying to and from Pakistan and Bangladesh, Chamling hopes to launch a bus service from Gangtok to Lhasa.
Optimistic business forums predict regional exports to Sikkim will touch US$203 million (RM750 million. The Indian Chamber of Commerce (ICC) has predicted unprecedented economic development of the entire region, which includes the Greater Mekong region of Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam, Thailand, Bangladesh, Bhutan and the Yunnan province of China.
However, it has based its predictions on some conditions. It hopes to secure the entire Indian northeastern region as a market for Chinese goods. Secondly, India has to become a new source of intermediate products, which could feed Chinese factories that produce manufactured goods. Thirdly, the northeastern region would have to push itself and become an agro-export zone.
Partnerships and joint ventures would help access the markets of third countries such as Taiwan, Indochina, Japan and Korea by utilising the Chinese export-marketing network.
All this is easier said than done. Indeed, there are reservations in India on the construction of road, rail and air links in the Tibet Autonomous Region. There are fears that the ongoing 1,118-km railway project to link Gormo in Chinas Qinghai province with Lhasa in Tibet will enhance the capability of Chinese troops in Tibet. This railway line, at a whopping US$27.2 billion, will connect Lhasa with four major centres in China. That this network of defence feeder railway lines from mainland China will touch the border with India has put the Indian defence establishment on alert. Two former prime ministers, P.V. Nara- simha Rao and H.D. Deve Gowda, had rejected proposals to open the trade route.
Nevertheless, Nathu La will open. Why did it take so long? It has been touch-and- go too often in Sino-Indian relations. Many think the misunderstandings that led to the military conflict in 1962 could have been resolved. In 1969, Indira Gandhi expressed willingness to resume relations and in 1970, Mao Zedong smiled his famous smile, calling India "a great country", adding: "They should live as friends. They cannot quarrel." But the next year, India got embroiled in Bangladesh. China sided with its ally Pakistan.
Indias designation of Arunachal Pradesh as a centrally administered territory angered China. After Sikkim joined the Indian Union, China remained the worlds only power not to recognise it as part of India.
Atal Behari Vajpayees 1979 visit as foreign minister was complicated by the Chinese attack on Vietnam. Deng Xiaoping added to Indias discomfiture by tactlessly drawing a parallel with the Chinese action against India in 1962. The Indian Foreign Minister had to cut short his visit.
Increasing influence in Nepal, Bangladesh and Myanmar, not to speak of the long-standing defence relationship with Pakistan and lack of support for Indias membership to the United Nations Security Council all point to Chinas attempts to prevent Indias rise as a regional and global player. It is a strategy China has consistently pursued without any apologies.
Progress on the contentious border dispute has been slow and halting, despite a number of high-level interactions. Yet a measure of understanding has been reached in the last decade. The roadblock caused by India testing nuclear devices in 1998 was surmounted faster than anyone could have imagined. The two now meet on the sidelines of conferences and at the UN, often finding convergence of ideas and interests.
In a money-driven relationship, India no longer fears cheap Chinese-made goods including idols of Hindu deities. Trade has crossed US$13 billion and may touch US$20 billion by 2008, ahead of the 2010 target. Indian Finance Minister P. Chidambaram said in Washington last week that far from envying China, he wanted to emulate its high rate of economic growth.
Bluntly put, India and China are two Asian powers with global aspirations and significant conflicting interests. Some friction in their bilateral relationship is inevitable. The geopolitical reality makes sure that it will be extremely difficult, if not impossible, for "Hindi-Chini" to be bhai-bhai (brothers) in the foreseeable future. But measures like trade across Nathu La can ensure a more meaningful relationship to the mutual good of the mankinds largest authoritarian regime and the second-largest democracy. -CNF