NORTH KOREA-PAKISTAN NUCLEAR NEXUS PART-II
By Sreedhar
These contacts appear to have culminated in the transfer of technology of the North Korean 1300 km range Nodong missile. According to media reports, North Korea sold Pakistan around 12 Nodong missiles, which was first test fired by the Pakistanis on April 6, 1998 as the Ghauri missile. A.Q. Khan is also known to have visited North Korea within weeks of the Ghauri missile test fire. Since then the Ghauri has been test fired on two more occasions. These missile tests baffled the international strategic community as normally most of the other missile producing countries took more than a decade to develop indigenous capabilities. Interestingly since both the countries were experiencing economic crisis, a barter deal, the first of its kind, missile technology for uranium enrichment process was struck between North Korea and Pakistan. This barter of technology suited both the countries as the Pakistanis needed missile technology to counter Indias military might, and the North Koreans were in need of the formers assistance in enriching uranium, a commodity that it had in abundance. Further, it was no longer possible for the North Koreans to extract plutonium for its nuclear programme, after the 1994 Agreed Framework. Hence came the need for the uranium enrichment method. Moreover, both these countries were also faced with a severe foreign exchange shortage and, therefore, this mode of exchange was the best alternative.
The North Korean vessel, KuWo-san was seized by the Indian authorities at Kandla Port. It was reportedly carrying a consignment of missile related material for Pakistan. The ships Chief Officer confessed that the ship was bound for Karachi. The cargo consisted of high altitude testing equipment, generator condensers and instruments for testing the performance and trajectory of ballistic missiles. The National Defence University, a leading US Defence think tank said in 1999 that North Korea had replaced China in providing Pakistan with long-range missiles and the relationship was likely to continue as long as India pursued its own missile programme.
There are also inputs to suggest that there exists a nexus between North Korean diplomats and Pakistans ISI. In May 1999, Rim Chang-ryol, the Third Secretary in the Embassy of North Korea in Kathmandu made a secret visit to Islamabad. It was in connection of the shipment, which was later seized in Kandla Port. Further the fact that Rim was issued a three months visa by the Indian Embassy in Kathmandu on July 15, 1999 appears to suggest that his visit to India could have been linked to the seizure of the ship at Kandla. Reports also suggest that the North Korean diplomats and Pak agents would coordinate the import of illegal shipment of arms. In another bizarre incidents, the wife of the economic Councellor at the North Korean embassy in Pakistan was murdered in June 1998. According to unnamed diplomatic sources in Pakistan, the lady was murdered because she was providing details of missile deals between North Korea and Pakistan to the Western intelligence agencies and had been murdered by North Korean agents working in the Khan Laboratories in Pakistan. Of significance is the fact that her husband Kang Thae-yun was the local representative of Changgwang Sinyong, the key supplier of missile components to Pakistan and Iran.
North Korea has also been involved in the supply of 122mm MBRL rockets and its technology for indigenous production to the Pakistan Space and Upper Atmosphere Commission. A Pyongyang had also been identified as supplying defence related material like and aluminium powder to Pakistan. Pakistan is also trying to acquire missiles with a range of 2500 kms from North Korea in knocked down condition. It would therefore not be surprising if both the countries are continuing their cooperation in this field as North Korea would gain from this association as by testing a North Korean design, Pyongyang gets valuable missile data to help it support its own programme.
A report Japans Jiji News Agency last year stated that after 9/11 development Pakistan had already informed the US that some Pak scientists were involved in the transfer of Uranium enrichment technology to North Korea. According to the report, President Musharraf had set up an investigative team in the year 2000, on the request of the US, to probe into Pakistans suspected transfer of nuclear technology to North Korea. The team discovered that certain scientists working at the A.Q.Khan Research Laboratory and some senior military officers had received remittances through their personal bank accounts as reward from North Korea for the transfer of uranium enrichment technology. The Pak government is also said to have informed the US that the transfers were due to rogue element links in Pakistani nuclear establishment and not on an inter-governmental basis. No one in the nuclear non-proliferation group is willing to buy this theory. They feel in a centralized nuclear command structure in Pakistan this is highly unlikely to happen.
The obvious question that comes up in this Pakistan- North Korea barter deal is why is the US going easy on Pakistan? The obvious explanation is that Pakistan is an ally in the US war against terrorism. As a neighbour of Afghanistan, Pakistan has a central staging area for the Bush Administrations efforts to capture Taliban and Osama bin Laden and other al-Qaeda ringleaders hiding in Pakistan. The US perceives that President Mushrrafs support has been key in pursuing terrorists as they flee Afghanistan, especially to anti- Western, radical Muslim communities in Pakistan. Therefore, the U.S. cannot afford to lose Pakistans cooperation.
Some others also argue that it is simply too dangerous to alienate Pakistan at this stage. It is possessor of nuclear weapons, but it also is the most politically unstable of all nuclear powers. It is economically bankrupt, and a home to rising Islamic radical groups. Given the existing circumstances, Pakistan could further proliferate nuclear weapons to other entities hostile to the U.S., including international terrorists.
This suspicion rises because Osama bin Ladens home land Saudi Arabia is believed to have funded part of Pakistans nuclear weapons program. In addition in 1988 Saudis acquired 3500 kms range Dong fend III missiles from China, demonstrating their eagerness to acquire ready to fire missiles In 2002 the Saudi defence minister was given an unusual tour of the centrifuge uranium enrichment labs by General Musharaf. This surprised everyone.
If this is the case, one can assume that the US is protecting Pakistan for the time being. The news leaks suggest that the U.S. government has stumbled upon credible evidence and is warning Pakistan publicly. According to one commentator.
Colin Powell has warned Musharraf that the U.S. will not tolerate any further exchanges, and that it will be keeping a close eye on Pakistans activities hereafter. Optimistic believe-hope-that it now appears likely that Pakistan will curtail its nuclear trade with North Korea, at least for now. Firstly, Mushrrafs comments to Powell suggest that 2002 summers transfers may have completed the North Korea-Pakistan nuclear barter arrangement. Second, if it did not before, Pakistan now understand that continuing nuclear transfers to North Korea (or elsewhere) will bring them into direct confrontation with the U.S. Lastly, Pakistans political credibility as a responsible nuclear power was destroyed.-CNF
(The writer was a Senior Fellow at Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi)