COLLATERAL DAMAGE TOO EXTENSIVE TO BE JUSTIFIABLE
By Prashant Dikshit
The United States has received a lot of flak for occasional bombing inaccuracies
in hitting targets in Afghanistan. Innocent lives have been lost, hospitals
destroyed and the destruction, generally, was avoidable. The US Administration's
stock explanation terming the destruction as collateral damage will not hold
good any more, specially when it is being put forth by the world's most high
tech air force. President Bush's special envoy for Afghanistan, Dr Zalmay
Khalilzad, on his recent visit to Kabul, tried to justify the last December
bombing on a convoy of tribal elders, saying there were some "undesirable
elements" in the group, and there was an investigation.
Accurate targeting calls for accurate detection, identification, analysis,
fixing location and finally accurate delivery of the weapon: and that order it
is easily said, but difficult to achieve, unless there are dedicated systems and
infrastructures working in close co-ordination. But to avoid "errors" and
accidental bombings, these are important.
For the American war machine, at the strategic level, the target information is
compiled by the National Reconnaissance office of USA. Although small details
are not openly known about the American spy satellites, several of them provide
regular imaging and sensing inputs to the reconnaissance office. These are
extremely high resolution sensing devices: one could say that it would be
possible to make out a hundred Taliban men in battle gear moving into tactical
cover in a building.
The system transmits all the information to attack formations, e.g., aircraft
carriers, forward bases or even directly to aircraft, if any happen to be in the
area. All this takes time and hostile groups or just a convoy of innocent
civilians, may have moved on in the intervening period. The attacking force,
therefore, has to re-confirm before it strikes to avoid unnecessary damage. One
does that with electronic snooping or most certainly, with sheer human watching.
Contrary to a popular belief, spy satellites cannot be stationary on a spot.
They orbit from north to south in most of the cases. One satellite can visit the
same spot once in a 24-hour cycle and the next visit may be a few days away. To
visit oftener, more satellites would be needed. It is then a matter of
arithmetic or more so of economics. In any case, a running commentary of the
situation is impossible and one has to be satisfied with a periodic update. The
satellite is a stationary platform possibly at 36,000 kms above the earth
through which objects smaller than a kilometre cannot be detected.
In the context of Afghanistan, spy satellites can, purely on their own, discover
regular military deployments only. Locations of lightly armed terrorist groups
would blend with the inhabited places and may not present a clearly
distinguishing feature on a picture. On the other hand, terrorist hideouts, if
singled out by ground intelligence, could be gleaned from satellite imagery and
suitably targeted with great accuracy. Apparently, there is much greater need
for judicious thinking and action.
In the tactical battle scenes at various locations in Afghanistan the spy
satellites would be useful in providing base data and pictures to facilitate
gathering of field intelligence. Combat fighter aircraft, equipped with very
high resolution imaging reconnaissance gear, could capture data on recorders or
a sensitive film which is made available to the analyst in real time. Again, his
analyses, with regard to terrorist activity must correlate with known ground
data in order to be authentic. Information gathered by battlefield surveillance
aircraft like Mohawk would greatly augment the data. The current available
reports so far do not indicate use of such aircraft.
For the matter, extended loiter operations with low-flying and slow-moving
aircraft, which have a great reconnaissance value, are not being seen at all. It
is limited to helicopters, moving in and out, perhaps for special operations
only. If this be true, despite the claims of air supremacy, the Air Force is
extremely reluctant to expose itself to small arms fire. There may even be a
fear of shoulder fired, Surface to Air Missiles, highly dangerous for low-flying
aircraft.
Weapon deliveries are either visual or through help of devices. The Tomahawk,
Cruise missile, launched initially to suppress Afghan defences, used navigation
and attack systems guided by the GPS. Whilst the manufacturers claim a circular
error probability of about twenty metres, the Cruise missile is known to have
hit targets as further away as 200 metres. In the midst of populated areas, that
would be devastating, as has already been demonstrated in Iraq or in Sudan
recently. Target information on Cruise missiles has to be precise, accurate and
beyond doubt. Because once released, there is not much scope to remedy the
error.
Carpet bombing is essentially, and always, an overkill method for neutralizing
the adversary. As an aerial strike option, it invites problems of spillovers to
areas, which should not have been touched. Despite claims of accuracy, there are
linear and lateral errors and probabilities of damage well beyond the target
increase as the aircraft flies higher during bombing missions. These errors in
the close proximity of populated areas in Afghanistan could be fatal and
compounded by the high attitude operations of B-52 bombers. Even the B-2 stealth
bomber, which is known to have visited targets in Afghanistan, is not free from
such hazards.
With the induction of special forces in Afghanistan, the quality of bombing
should improve and must be adversary specific. Laser illumination of targets by
these specially trained troops, facilitates most precise targeting by laser
guided bombs. Errors, if any, will be mainly of poorly processed intelligence.
The American objectives in Afghanistan are purely to ferret out the terrorists
and eliminate them. With this view, the application of air power must be
circumspect and well considered. -CNF
(Prashant Dikshit is a retired Air Commodore of the Indian Air Force. He was
previously a Senior Fellow at the Institute for Defence Studies, New Delhi,
where he continues to be an Associate Member)