PAST SINS FRUSTRATE OPERATIONS IN AFGHANISTAN
By Sreedhar
The US-led Grand Coalition's war on terrorism, that started on 7th October 2001
is not yet over. The war objectives, the Grand Coalition set for itself,
included catching people responsible for 11 September 2001 acts of terrorism and
violence, and those that harboured them dead or alive and bringing them to
justice, destroying the Pakistan - Taliban al-Qaida network, were partially
achieved within 100 days. Large scale military operations were over by December
2001, but the painstaking search for leadership responsible for 11th September
2001 continues with the end result being uncertain. According to unconfirmed
reports, at least some of the top leaders of the combine have found shelter in a
Pakistan-held area.
To understand the challenges being thrown up by the 11th September attacks and
the response of the Great Powers against terrorism, one should have a quick look
at the origin and growth of the PATAaQ phenomenon over the years. If we take
Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989 as a benchmark, the Great Powers left
Afghanistan as Pakistan's war booty. In their excitement of victory over the
Soviet Union, they forgot that a failed state like Pakistan was not fit to
undertake reconstruction of a war ravaged country like Afghanistan. The
Pakistani objectives of this new opportunity were clear.
They wanted a pro-Pakistani regime to be established in Kabul to provide it the
much-needed "strategic depth" in the event of an Indo-Pak war. Though unstated,
many in the Indian strategic community suspect that in the event of another
Indo-Pak war Pakistan wanted to launch its attacks from Afghan soil to place
India in a dilemma of whom to attack.
However, the Pakistan plans did not work. After the Geneva and Peshawar Accords
failed to form a government in Kabul, Pakistan literally played musical chairs
with the Afghan political leadership. Finally in 1994, Pakistan's Inter Service
Intelligence (ISI) agency decided to create a totally new leadership. The
Taliban thus was born. How Taliban was born and the relationship between the ISI
and Taliban ware brilliantly documented by a Pakistan journalist, M. Ilyas Khan,
in an article, last year.
According to Ilyas Khan, the fall of Kandahar in October 1994 truly launched
Mullah Omar's career as commander of the faithful or amirul momineen. In this
campaign, the Taliban were joined by hordes of fighters described by observers
as "military - trained students of JUI madrasas in Balochistan. There are
recurrent, though unconfirmed, reports that these students included professional
army soldiers sent in by Pakistan to free a trade convoy held up by a local
commander near Kandahar".
"Another feature of the Kandahar campaign was that the city fell without a
fight. Unconfirmed reports suggested that the Kandahar governer, Gul Agha, was
given massive bribes for ordering his troops to surrender. Bribes have also
reportedly featured in most of the Taliban's subsequent victories in southern
Afghanistan as well as in the north. According to one report, the Taliban
secured Bamiyan city after paying 800 millions dollars to the Hizb - r- Wahadat
commander," says Khan.
"Prior to the fall of Kandahar, little is known about the activities of Mullah
Omar and his band of the Taliban. According to Taliban anecdotes, the movement
started from Mullah Omar's village mosque in Sangesar, 15 kilometres west of
Kandahar city. But there aren't enough anecdotes to explain how they traversed
unnoticed some 90 kilometres of mujahideen-infested territory past Kandahar
border in the east, where they scored their first military victory. The capture
of Spin Boldak, a town just a few kilometres inside the Afghan border on the
Chaman - Kandahar road, gave the Taliban recognition as well as custody of what
Pakistani officials described as "an enormous quantity" of military material,
including rockets, ammunition, artillery pieces and small arms," Khan points
out.
Some observers believe that the Taliban received full-scale logistics support
from the Pakistanis at Spin Boldak. They argue that since the days of the jihad,
the ISI had been running a programme of supplying arms and ammunition to
guerrilla groups for ISI-approved operations. In addition, there were reports at
the time that the US government provided over 400 million dollars to open an
arms pipeline to the Taliban," writes Khan.
Fresh weapons supplies to the Taliban from Pakistan territory continued through
subsequent years. "As recently as March 2001, the Herald interviewed a truck
driver and some Taliban operatives at Sarobi town on the Kabul - Jalalabad road
who said they had unloaded rocket - propelled grenades from a Pakistani truck
that entered Afghanistan via Torkham. The explosives were supplied to Taliban
positions in the Tagab area, they said. Sources at Torkham confirmed the daily
crossing of "dozens of tarpaulin - covered trucks" with the ISI's authorisation
that precludes customs checks." The invoices generally described the goods as,
say, fertilisers or wheat, but officials were not allowed to conduct physical
checks. Ilyas Khan had, "days after the Taliban captured Kabul in September
1996" met a large number of Pakistan 'technicians' in Kabul who said they were
laying telephone cables for the new regime. More surprising was the presence of
a senior ISI official who was apparently performing the basic command and
control task in Kabul.
The visiting Pak journalist had come across units offering training to the
Taliban and other jihadi groups in more than 10 training camps across
Afghanistan. One such unit was dispatched by the ISI's Afghan Bureau to the
former Afghan army base of Rishkhor, near Kabul, in September 1996. In 1997, a
UN report on Afghanistan quoted its employees as having encountered "an
unidentified foreign military training unit of several hundred persons near
Kabul."
The operations of these units in Afghanistan were facilitated by Pakistan's
embassy in Kabul and its consulates in Kandahar and Herat. The consulates were
headed by ISI operative - turned - diplomats, who donned Taliban's Kandahari
clothes and wore turbans. Pakistani trainers and military advisors also grew
beards and rubbed shoulders with the Arab operative of Osama bin Laden, the
chief financier of training camps in Afghanistan."
"The question as to whether Pakistanis also offered active combat support to the
Taliban remains disputed but analysis points to some circumstantial evidence to
show that such support was indeed offered in certain major battles. In Herat,
for instance, the Taliban switched from the jihadi-style hit - and - run
operation to the innovative' mobile warfare.
A similar flair for speed and flank attacks characterised the battle for Kabul
in September 1996 and that for Mazar - I - Sharif in August 1998. On both
occasions, credible reports confirmed the presence of Pakistani military advisor
in the Taliban ranks. Significantly, say analysts, the Taliban efficiency
disappeared when they embarked on operations launched independently of their
Pakistan advisors. For instance, the Taliban's abortive attack on Herat in April
1995 was carried out without the approval of the ISI. In Mazar, the Talibans
battle efficiency disappeared when Pakistani advisors were pulled out in the
wake of the crisis sparked by the killing of Iranian diplomats.
"The presence of professional Pakistani fighters became most obvious during the
Taliban's attack on Taloqan, the capital of northern Takhar province, in
September 2000. There were also reports that Pakistani aircraft were used to
rotate Talibani troops on Pakistani - Taliban frontlines,"' Iliyan Khan
reported.
The most crucial part of his observations relates to Osama bin Laden. "While
this Pakistan-Taliban partnership was blossoming, in May 1996, Saudi millionaire
Osama bin Laden returned to Afghanistan. His arrival brought in a new dimension
to the Pak - Taliban combine. Being better with monetary resources, due to
liberal donations from the Arab world to his activities, he enlarged the scope
of the agenda of Pak - Taliban combine. It no longer remained the establishment
of a puritanical Islamic state as understood by Pak - Taliban combine, but to
remove the injustices being done to the Muslims across the world and establish a
Pan - Islamic world.
Towards this end, he established in February 1998, Al-Jabhah al - Islamiya al -
Alamujah li - Qittar al - Yahud wal - Salibiyyin (The Islamic World Front for
the Struggle against Jews and the Crusaders). Its mission was to found and
assist the prominent Islamic movements in the Arab countries, particularly
groups like Egypt's al - Jihad and al - Gama'a al - Islamiya, but also
organisations like Algeria's GIA." Osama bin Laden family's close ties with
Saudi royal family brought it tacit approval of the custodians holy shrines of
Islam.
Here two questions need to be answered. Why did Pakistan join this network?
After the Kargil war of summer 1999, it became clear to its leadership that it
will not be allowed to fight a war with India by the Great Powers. The
deteriorating domestic economic situation has forced Pakistan to be dependent on
Great Powers for its economic revival. Therefore, proxy war was the only option
left to it. Having decided upon it, the ruling elite of Pakistan adopted a
strategy of tacit approval to participating in the Taliban - al - Qaida gameplan.
Technically, there was no official participation. But different wings of the
Pakistani armed forces were allowed to continue to participate in Kabul -
Kandahar actions like they do in Jammu and Kashmir of the Indian Union. Pakistan
extended "diplomatic, moral and political support" to Taliban movement, "
according to a report in The Nation, Karachi.
The other related questions is why Taliban - al - Qaida coopted Pakistan?
Pakistan proved to be a trusted ally of the Pashtoons of Afghanistan. It has a
professional army with nuclear weapons and can be a core-armed force for the
proposed Islamic army. The triumvirate, Pakistan - Taliban - al - Qaida (PATAaQ)
combine also realised that it will take a long time to counter the professional
armies of the adversaries. Therefore, an unconventional war (or proxy war or war
through terrorism and violence) was adopted to attack the enemy. The PATAaQ also
worked on the assumption, since they are fighting for the Islamic cause, the
Islamic world will extend the needed support to them. -CNF
(The author is a senior research associate at the Institute for Defence Studies
and Analyses, New Delhi)