WILL MUSHARRAF SURVIVE?
By Sreedhar
Islamabad's refusal to allow landing rights to British troops proceeding to
Afghanistan has not surprised Pakistan observers in New Delhi. Though it made no
difference to British troops as they could go to Afghanistan via Uzbekistan,
Gen. Musharraf got a chance to show that he was not obeying orders blindly from
the US and in fact was defying the Super Power largely to placate the
anti-American elements of the National Movement for Restoration of Sovereignty
of Pakistan. Will this bale out Gen Musharraf?
The developments of the past few weeks in Pakistan indicate three distinct
trends. The General who came to power through a military coup is not interested
in giving up his power. The referendum idea, which Gen. Pervez Musharraf floated
to gain legitimacy, reminds one of a similar exercise by Gen. Zia-ul-Haq in
1980's. Having marginalized or discredited all the political parties, he wants
to get a stamp of approval for his authority from the people of Pakistan. One
can be reasonably certain that he obtained the approval of the West for his
proposed referendum, because they have to provide some goodies on the eve of the
exercise to show to the people the clout he enjoys.
Here Gen. Musharraf is making two fundamental mistakes. It is a known fact of
contemporary history that Generals who usurp power are bad in governance. Most
of the Generals end up taking the country to the brink of a civil war. Even in
Pakistan, of the three Generals that ruled, Ayub Khan was removed from power
disgracefully after the 1965 war; Yahya Khan partitioned the country into two
and was forced to step down. Gen. Zia, who was for short-term gains, led the
country in the direction in which it is today. Unfortunately, his tenure ended
in a violent death.
Gen. Musharraf is fighting battles on so many fronts. On the domestic front, his
adversaries include jihadis, fellow men in the armed forces and religious
extremists: the list is endless. All the reports coming from Pakistan indicate
that going is tough for him. If the unconfirmed reports of plots to overthrow
him are any indication, his position is fragile. His tall claims apart, the
ground situation indicates that he can be eased out of his office by a fellow
man in uniform, in spite of all the protection from the US. "Today he is afraid
of his shadow even," said a Pakistan commentator privately.
Second, Pakistanis are not quick learners. They refuse to accept that in the
unipolar world of today, Indo-US relations have undergone a qualitative change;
and they are no longer tied down to Pak-US relations. In fact, everyone has
noted the games the Pakistani establishment is playing with Taliban-Al-Qaeda.
Gen. Musharraf might have changed Pakistan's policy towards Afghanistan/Taliban,
but the change is not meeting the US objectives of the ongoing war in
Afghanistan.
Taliban-Al-Qaeda leadership is being provided safe havens by the Pakistani
agencies, including the ISI. By making Taliban largely a Pashtoon movement, the
tribal loyalties between the people on both sides of Pak-Afghan border got
involved in it. By mid-March 2002 the US war on terrorism underwent a
qualitative change. The US, even as it continued fighting the Taliban-Al-Qaeda,
it was forced to contemplate in terms of opening a front against people in NWFP
and Balochistan provinces of Pakistan who are providing safe havens to the
hostile groups. This means one can expect in the coming weeks, US bombing in
parts of this region.
What effect it will have on the US is anyone's guess. It will certainly unleash
a wave of anti-US resentment across Pakistan. Anticipating such an eventuality,
the US has started evacuating non-diplomatic staff from Pakistan.
Pakistani jihadi groups, which are doing shadowboxing with Gen. Musharraf about
his changed policy on Afghanistan, are out to be on the streets, along with
Pashtoons, demanding the General's removal. One can anticipate some fireworks in
Balochistan and NWFP. What direction these movements will take is again
difficult to predict. It may question the very domination of Punjabi mafia. Even
the Punjabi mafia may turn against the General, if India unilaterally abrogates
the Indus River Water Treaty of 1960 and deny water for kharif crop in the next
sowing season. As and when India decides to do it, the position of Gen.
Musharraf will become further precarious. His own Punjabi constituency will
revolt against him. The feudal lords of Punjab are notorious for sharply
reacting to the policies affecting their economic interests.
In these circumstances, Gen. Musharraf's position is between the 'devil and the
deep sea'. The US is threatening to take punitive action against Pakistan for
not implementing the promise he made about the so-called jihadis. The Indian
threat is coercive diplomacy, but do they mean it, he is not too sure. He is
aware that the visits of Indian VIP's may be more to make on-the-spot reading of
the situation than anything else.
Therefore, India is not in a hurry to open channels of communication with a
tinpot dictator about whose future no one is certain. Until 3 A's - Allah, Army,
America, decide Pakistan's future, India can wait. That is what South Block
mandarins say. -CNF
(The author is a senior research associate at the Institute for Defence Studies
and Analyses, New Delhi)